Ami Ayalon (1996 – 2000), center
Yaakov Peri (1988 – 1995)
Avi Dichter (2000 – 2005)
THE GATEKEEPERS (Shomerei Ha'saf)
B+
Israel France Germany Belgium (95 mi)
2012 d: Dror Moreh
When you retire, you
become a bit of a leftist.
—Yaakov Peri, former Shin Bet chief
Loosely inspired by the Errol Morris film THE FOG OF WAR
(2003), as the film interviews 6 former heads of Israel's Security Agency Shin Bet,
responsible for the nation’s internal security including the Israeli-occupied territories, an
agency so secretive that until recently the names of the operation chiefs were
known only by their initials, men with unique roles in the newly developing
history of Israel and men whose opinions matter, though the director, a former
Israeli soldier himself, hardly merits comparison with Morris, who is one of
the great journalists of our era who also happens to excel in making
exceptional documentary films. While the film should be considered
mandatory viewing, as it offers a brilliantly concise overview of events in
the Middle East since the 1967 Six-Day War, analyzed and recalled by articulate
and powerful men who sat at the head of their nation’s security, one of the
overall achievements of the film is simply bringing these former security
chiefs together to discuss their role in the war on terrorism, Palestinians and
the occupied territories, settlements, the peace accord, and their views of the
future. It’s interesting that the men largely reflect upon their own
failures, not the morally questionable and oftentimes abhorrent tactics used,
but in the overall outcome, suggesting Israel is no safer now despite all the
drastic security measures taken, including targeted assassinations of known
terrorists. The film suggests the event that forever changed Israeli
history was the fanatical act of a rabidly right-wing, extremist Israeli law
student named Yigal Amir who opposed the Oslo Peace Accords (Oslo
Accords) and assassinated Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in 1995, as that put
an end to continuing the peace process and shifted the focus of terrorists
abroad to terrorists within. The agency had to completely reorganize its
targets and priorities, eventually catching Jewish right-wing extremists in the
act of plotting to blow up the Dome
of the Rock, offended that an ancient Arab shrine would overlook sacred
places of Jewish worship. It turns out these religious fanatics were
backed by prominent Israelis, men connected to the democratic mainstream of
Israeli politics, and despite efforts that may have incited a Holy War, which
was actually their most fervent religious intent, believing the ensuing chaotic
apocalypse would bring about the return of the Messiah, they were tried and
convicted, but quickly released from prison due to their close political
connections, returning back to their neighborhoods as anointed heroes.
The quick shift from Intifada Palestinian protests against the Israeli
government to large rallies of right-wing Israelis protesting against the same
Israeli government advocating peace with the Palestinians was a bit stunning,
especially when current Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was at that time one
of the most defiantly outspoken leaders of the Likud party against
peace, parading coffins of the embattled Prime Minister Rabin as part of their
protest, literally inciting the violence that lead to Rabin’s assassination.
That is easily the most remarkable insinuation of the movie, but it comes from
the filmmaker, not any of the agency heads.
While each of the men has a unique style and different personality,
all profiled on the movie website The Gatekeepers, Avraham Shalom (1980 – 1986) is
the oldest, and despite his gentle, grandfatherly look, sitting there in red
suspenders, he had no problem whatsoever with Israeli security forces hauling a
Palestinian hijacker off a bus and beating him to death under his watch in
1984, suggesting one has to “forget about morality” when dealing with terrorists.
With that sly look in his eye, he insisted no one would have known if there
wasn’t a journalist onboard the bus exposing the incident. One of the
more provocative techniques was using grainy security footage, often with a
targeted scope, showing how cars driving down the streets could quickly be
eliminated by missile fire, causing Yuval Diskin (2005 – 2011) to reflect upon
the awesome power to decide who lives and who dies, suggesting there’s
something unnatural about holding that amount of power in your hands.
There are, of course, negative repercussions to firing rockets in heavily
congested urban areas, as there is collateral damage, including the potential
deaths of innocents. Part of the problem was the choice of weaponry,
dropping 1-ton bombs, which was the technique of the times and something of
overkill, becoming much more sophisticated and accurate today, though one was
reminded of an American missile that killed 70 people at an Afghan wedding.
Though it was never mentioned in the film, this raises the question of the use
of drones by the American military, which are the most accurate, yet collateral
damage remains if the intelligence isn’t as precise as the missiles. The
question becomes, does the use of the weapon deteriorate the effectiveness of
the enemy? In the case of al Qaeda, this is the only effective means of
eliminating their leadership, as capturing them, preparation and cost-wise, not
to mention the potential loss of lives involved, is simply out of the question.
Israel faced these exact same security questions about what to do with
terrorists long before the Americans came into the picture. Unlike the
rather apathetic American public, which remains isolated, thousands of miles
away from where the terrorists actually reside, the Israeli public only became
more outraged at becoming such easy targets for retaliation, as they were the
first victims of suicide bombers, where there was plenty of accumulated
bloodshed on both sides.
After expressing an interest in hearing from the Shin Bet
chiefs, Ami Ayalon (1996 – 2000) was the first one approached, a highly
decorated military officer brought in at the worst time, after the agency
failed to protect the nation’s Prime Minister. His no nonsense approach
offers a clue into the psychology of these men, as on the job one must be
steady and sure-handed, making decisions exuding leadership qualities, as
you’re literally setting an example for an entire security force. But
afterwards, when one has had time to reflect, you can pull out quotes from old
soldiers like Karl von Clausewitz, a German-Prussian soldier and military
theorist who claimed “Victory is the creation of a better political reality.”
His argument is one does not have to kill every last man in order to declare
victory, as Israel has won literally every military confrontation and
successfully assassinated nearly all those most responsible for acting upon the
destruction and annihilation of Israel, yet in the same breath Yuval Diskin
declares “One man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter. We wanted
security and got more terrorism.” For every attack Israel initiated, the
Palestinians counterattacked, drawing blood for blood, making sure the
seemingly stronger military power paid a huge price for their actions,
resulting in an escalating war of revenge that only accumulated more and more
casualties on each side. If anything, other than the mistakes made in
allowing Rabin’s assassination, these men aren’t questioning their own actions,
but critiquing their government, where Shalom acknowledges that in the
accumulating bloodlust, “We have become cruel,” suggesting they continue to
brutally treat their neighbors as potentially deadly enemies, as after Rabin,
there has been no political will for peace. Israeli settlements in the
occupied territories, prohibited in the original peace provisions, have doubled
since Rabin’s death, mostly by zealous right-wing religious groups lead by
equally fanatical rabbi’s who are willing to risk their lives promoting Zionism.
This kind of stirred up nationalist religious fervor makes no room for peace,
and current Prime Minister Netanyahu’s right-wing majority thrives on this much
needed rabid support. Netanyahu, who refused to see this documentary, has
called U.S. backed peace talks a waste of time, offering lip service to a
side-by-side two-state solution that includes a Palestinian state, while
right-wing members of Netanyahu's governing coalition criticize even the mere
suggestion of a Palestinian State, believing all of the land should remain
under Israeli sovereignty. So it comes as a bit of a surprise that those
once charged with providing for the nation’s security have all grown to regret
the hawkish direction of the country afterwards, where according to Avi Dichter
(2000 – 2005), "You can't make peace using military means. Enough of
the occupation. We cannot win this battle. We have to try to
compromise. If we try to eat the whole cake and not share it we will
lose.”
According to an
interview with the Huffington Post,
the director believes American Jews look to Israel as a post-Holocaust “safe
haven,” suggesting they are drawing “the wrong conclusion…that they have to
support Israel no matter what,” a view the director believes is “damaging the
state of Israel.” According to Moreh, “They don't understand that we are
going towards an apartheid country. By not criticizing it, by accepting
everything Israel does politically and especially towards the conflict, they
are damaging their own goal, to protect the state of Israel as a safe haven for
them.” Accordingly, the film has not been shown on Israeli television,
and the subjects of the film, the various former heads of the Shin Bet security
service have not been invited to speak before certain “pro-Israel” groups in
America, the kind that equate support with blanket approval of Israeli policies.
Any film that critiques the current policies would not be welcomed in those
organizations. The heads of Shin Bet acknowledge they engaged in brutal
methods used to detain, interrogate, and stop terrorists, but virtually the
only Israeli Prime Minister in the past 30 years who was open to negotiation
with the Palestinians was Yitzhak Rabin, who broke the pattern and attempted to
develop a lasting peace with Israel’s neighbors. According to Avraham
Shalom, Israel should remain open to talking to anyone, including Hamas,
insisting upon negotiating peace and ending its occupation of the West Bank.
It’s the only option that can alter the endless cycle of the threat of
terrorism from abroad and the repression of individual rights at home, as
otherwise Israel is heading into a modern era police state. “It
completely reflects my views,” said Yaakov Peri (1988 – 1995). “We
discuss these things among ourselves. We all agree,” adding emphatically that
every ex-Mossad chief and most former army chiefs feel the same way. “The
six of us reached our opinions from different personal backgrounds and different
political outlooks, but we’ve all reached the same conclusion,” Ami Ayalon
said. “Many Israelis and American Jews want to deny it, but this is our
professional opinion. We’re at the edge of an abyss, and if Israeli-Palestinian
peace doesn’t progress, it’s the end of Zionism.”
